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TRADE AS A GUARANTOR OF PEACE,
LIBERTY AND SECURITY? THE ROLE OF




At a time when globalization has facilitated transnational
commerce and transnational terror, it is imperative that we examine
the relationship between free trade and peace. On February 24, 2005,
the International Economic Law Interest Group ("IELG") of the
American Society of International Law ("ASIL") held the Opening
Session of a three-day conference at American University,
Washington College of Law, entitled: "The Role of Peace in the
Bretton Woods Institutions."' The goal of the conference was to
address the accuracy of the claim made by John Stuart Mill and
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law and Co-
Chair, IELG, ASIL (2003-2005).
1. The IELG is the largest interest group within ASIL and has for many years
held annual and bi-annual meetings to promote scholarship and discussion of
cutting edge issues in international economic law. Since 1995, the work of the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") and its dispute settlement mechanism has
been of particular interest to the IELG. Historically, the papers presented at IELG
conferences are published in a law review. This year, however, the Opening
Session of the conference has been published separately here while the complete
proceedings of the conference are scheduled to be published as a separate book by
ASIL. This Opening Session panel was co-sponsored by the Washington College
of Law ("WCL") International Legal Studies Program and was part of WCL's
Founders Celebration.
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others that trade is the guarantor of peace, liberty and security.
Participants on the panel were: Ambassador Julio A. Lacarte, a
former member of the Appellate Body of the WTO and one of the
architects of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations; James
Boughton, International Monetary Fund ("IMF") historian; Debra
Steger, a former Director of the WTO Appellate Body Secretariat
and a Canadian representative to the Uruguay Round trade
negotiations; and Uri Dadush, Director of the International Trade
Department of the World Bank. The pages following this
introduction contain the transcript of the remarks of Ambassador
Lacarte, James Boughton, Debra Steger and Uri Dadush-edited by
the panelists to varying degree-in which they discuss the role of the
IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO (collectively referred to as the
"Bretton Woods Institutions" or "BWI") in safeguarding and
promoting peace.
James Boughton reminds us that for the two intellectual fathers of
the IMF-John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White-securing
and maintaining peace was central, not peripheral, to the work of the
IMF. As Boughton explains, the role of trade in generating prosperity
and peace was raised in the aftermath of the First World War by
President Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference. For a
variety of reasons, Wilson failed to have that particular viewpoint
reflected in the ultimate outcome of the peace conference. It took
another world war to bring to the foreground the relationship
between peace and economic prosperity. In the aftermath of World
War II, the victorious nations agreed that it was economic
deprivation caused by protectionist and discriminatory economic
policies that had facilitated the rise of Adolf Hitler and fascism in
Europe. At Bretton Woods, the participants vowed to "never again"
allow such protectionist policies, and the BWI were set up to help
maintain peace by helping to secure economic prosperity.
Ambassador Julio A. Lacarte agrees that it was the failure of the
Paris Peace Conference and the resulting protectionist policies of the
1930s, including the passage by the U.S. Congress of the Smoot
Hawley Tariff Act, that facilitated the rise of fascism in Europe;
Ambassador Lacarte also reminds us of the precarious existence of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade from 1947 until the
eventual creation of the WTO in 1995. Drawing upon more than fifty
years of personal involvement in trade negotiations, Ambassador
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Lacarte warns us that although the creation of the WTO has
advanced the cause of peace by providing an institutional and
regulatory framework for the multilateral trading system, a great deal
more must be done by the BWI to address the concerns of the
developing countries and thereby advance the cause of global peace.
Debra Steger highlights the unique institutional challenges faced
by the WTO, including a lack of compliance with dispute settlement
decisions by the United States and Europe, the increasing popularity
of bilateral and regional trade agreements, and the WTO's continued
ambiguous mandate, which has pitted the United States and Europe
against the developing world-a situation that is not conducive to
global harmony.
Finally, Uri Dadush points out that trade has not always promoted
peace and, in some instances, has been the cause of war. Dadush
argues that in fact it is peace that is a prerequisite for free trade.
Dadush reminds us that unprecedented global market integration in
the latter part of the nineteenth century resulted not in peace, but the
First World War. He argues that other "drivers of conflicts," such as
ethnic divisions and religious differences, can overwhelm the
economic gains from free trade. Dadush posits that we may be living
at a moment in history when the champion of free trade is no longer
the United States, but China and India.
All the speakers agree that we live in a time of transition. We have
seen a period of unprecedented inter-connectedness. The end of the
Cold War and the creation of the WTO in the 1990s has set the
groundwork for securing peace through international cooperation.
There are, however, forces at work that threaten peace as well as the
legitimacy of the BWI. Will the WTO membership come to an
agreement as to its mandate and the agenda for the next round of
trade negotiations? Will bilateral and regional trading arrangements
lead to unity or division? How will the United States respond to the
growing economic ascendancy of China and India? Will the United
States resort to protectionist policies against China? What will the
effects of such policies be on global peace and security? Are we
destined to repeat the mistakes of the past and have a period of
unprecedented global integration followed by disintegration?
Answers to these and many other such questions will determine
whether the IMF, World Bank or the WTO can promote and
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safeguard peace as originally envisioned by Keynes and White at
Bretton Woods.
TRADE AS A GUARANTOR OF PEACE,
LIBERTY AND SECURITY? THE ROLE OF
PEACE IN THE BRETTON WOODS
INSTITUTIONS
THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN PEACE AND
SECURITY
JAMES M. BOUGHTON*
Thank you very much, Padideh. What Padideh did not tell you
about my resume is that my real role in the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") is to speak from time to time on topics that most
people think are totally peripheral to what the IMF is supposed to be
doing, but that in fact are completely central to the real issues in the
world economy today.
In the last couple of years alone I've given talks on the IMF's role
in alleviating global poverty, on the IMF and global governance, and
on the IMF and Christian ethics and human rights. So when Padideh
called me and asked me if I could give a talk on "The IMF and Peace
and Global Security," this seemed completely natural for my role in
life. When I told some of my colleagues I was going to do this, they
said, "You're going to talk about what?" And I said, "No, no, no, this
is exactly what we should be thinking a lot more about."
So, I've just prepared a very quick little talk which I will illustrate
a little bit as we go along. The first point I'd like to make is that this
* James Boughton is Historian of the International Monetary Fund and has written
extensively on international financial issues. Before joining the IMF, he was
Professor of Economics at Indiana University. The views expressed in these
remarks are those of the author and not necessarily those of the IMF.
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topic of the IMF and Peace and Security was absolutely central at the
time that the IMF was founded. It was not a peripheral issue at all.
The two intellectual founding fathers of the Fund are shown here
in the photograph, sharing a private joke of some kind in the
corridors of the Mount Washington Hotel during the Bretton Woods
Conference that established the IMF and the World Bank in July,
1944.1 In the left of this picture is Harry Dexter White, who was the
de facto head of the U.S. delegation. The much more famous man on
his right-the one with the toothy grin-is John Maynard Keynes,
the head of the British delegation. These two men together drafted
the charters for the IMF and the World Bank in 1944. They worked
together throughout the period of World War II, at least since the
United States joined the war effort at the end of 1941. They worked
very hard throughout 1942, 1943, and the first half of 1944 to create
these two great institutions.
As they worked together through this terrible period of World War
II, both Keynes and White had a keen sense, which they expressed in
many different ways, of the link between establishing an open
system of trade and finance and the achievement of both peace and
prosperity after the war was over. These were two men who had been
young adults during and shortly after World War I. They had seen
the kinds of horrors that Ambassador Lacarte talks about, they had
seen the failure of the Paris Peace Conference to reestablish either
peace or prosperity after the First World War, and they were
determined not to let that happen again. Both men also had the full
support and backing of their respective governments, led by
Churchill and Roosevelt.
At the opening session at Bretton Woods, in July 1944, the
Secretary of the Treasury for the United States, Henry Morgenthau,
Jr., expressing the sentiments of the Roosevelt administration said,
"Prosperity, like peace, is indivisible." Everybody recognized, of
course, that peace was indivisible. One country cannot be at peace if
others are not. But the idea that prosperity, like peace, was also
indivisible, that one country could not sustain development and
wealth unless it was shared widely throughout the world, was a much
1. See Diagram, infra p. 1125.
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more controversial proposition, but one that was pushed very hard by
the Roosevelt administration, including at Bretton Woods.
Among the principles that Harry White and Maynard Keynes had
grown up with were U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's famous
"Fourteen Points," which formed the basis of Wilson's vision for a
world order after the Great War, as it was then known. What
everybody remembers about Wilson's fourteen points was peace, but
prosperity and trade, the role of trade in generating prosperity, was
also there. Number three among Wilson's fourteen points was "the
removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its
maintenance." Unfortunately, it didn't happen.
As Margaret MacMillan relates brilliantly in her recent book,
Paris 1919,2 this point number three of Wilson's fourteen points just
got lost among all the effort that was spent trying to redraw all the
borders of the world in those six months that Wilson spent in Paris
with his colleagues from the other victorious powers. He did manage
to achieve the creation of the League of Nations, but without the
United States being a member and without it having very much teeth
to achieve anything.
The League did have an economic section, which worked valiantly
throughout the interwar period and even continued during World
War II, having left Geneva and setting up camp in Princeton instead.
But all the efforts that were made between the two wars to try to
establish cooperation were very piecemeal, they were very short
lived, and they were difficult to sustain or repeat, because there was
no institutionalization of the effort to establish cooperative trade and
financial relationships between the wars.
Where Wilson had gone wrong was in failing to institutionalize
the process. He had a vision for what needed to be done, but he did
not have a well developed strategy for how to achieve it. So there
was no real institutional economic structure after the First World
2. MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919: SIx MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD (2003).
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War, and it was the idea of preventing a repeat of that failure that
was very much on the minds of Keynes and White in 1944.
To understand how important international cooperation was to
Keynes, it helps to reflect for a moment on his role at the Paris Peace
Conference. A dozen years earlier, when Keynes was still in graduate
school at Cambridge University, he had sat for the British Civil
Service exams with an eye toward working in London at either the
Treasury or the India Office. Whoever did best on the exams would
get first choice of the open positions, whoever placed second would
get the next choice, and so on. Now when Keynes took these exams
in 1906, he came in second. He was a brilliant student, but it seems
he didn't study very hard. Now what follows is a serious lesson for
all the law students in the audience tonight! Keynes' biographer, Sir
Roy Harrod, told a fascinating story about the consequences of
Keynes not studying hard enough for his exams in 1906. Keynes'
first choice was a job at the Treasury, and his second choice was the
India Office. The student who came in first took the Treasury job,
and Keynes went to work on the Indian economy. He wrote a
wonderful book about Indian currency issues, but he was not dealing
with the really major issues facing Britain and the world economy.
By the time Keynes was part of the British Treasury delegation at
the peace conference twelve years later in Paris, he was a very junior
member of the team. He recognized right away that the conference
was going to fail, in the sense that the economic ideas that the leaders
of the world were talking about in Paris were simply wrong and were
going to lead to disastrous consequences. He saw this very clearly,
he left the conference, he quit his job, and he went home and wrote a
best selling book about it called The Economic Consequences of the
Peace.3
So Roy Harrod asks, what if Keynes had come in first on his
exams? He would have taken the job at the Treasury in 1906. By
1918 when he went off to Paris, he would have been a senior
member of the delegation instead of the low man on the totem pole.
At that level, he might have been able to convince David Lloyd
George, the Prime Minister, that the economic demands that they
3. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE
(1919).
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were planning to impose on Germany were not going to work. With
the force of his intellect, he could also have convinced the
Americans, the French, and the Italians to take a more constructive
approach, and we would not have had the disastrous economic
policies of the interwar period. The German economy would not
have collapsed in the 1920s, Hitler would not have come to power in
1933, and we would never have had World War II! If only Keynes
had studied harder for his exams .... Obviously, there are some
weak links in Harrod's argument, but it's not as silly as it may seem.
The point is simply that the link between trade and peace and
prosperity was an issue that Keynes had been thinking deeply about
for most of his adult life by the time he got to Bretton Woods in
1944.
On the American side, Harry Dexter White had a similar but even
broader vision. Keynes saw the primary purpose of the Bretton
Woods institutions as to try to get Europe back on its feet, and in
particular of course to get Britain back on its feet. White saw the
primary purpose as to establish and preserve peace. Therefore, in his
mind the key was not the economic relationship between the United
States and Great Britain. The key was the strategic relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
White worked very hard for six months, throughout the whole first
half of 1944, to ensure that the Soviet Union would join the IMF and
the World Bank. He made sure they got a large enough voting share,
and he made sure that they had special provisions put in the charters
that would reflect the tightly controlled and centralized Soviet
economic system. He succeeded up to the point of getting the Soviets
to sign the agreements at Bretton Woods and agree to join the new
institutions, but at the last minute, at the end of 1945, Josef Stalin
himself decided that the Soviet Union was not going to join the IMF
or the World Bank.
In fact, as long as the Soviet Union existed, until it collapsed in
1991, it never did join the Bretton Woods Institutions. So there was a
major failure, and that was the failure of this emphasis on trade and
prosperity to forestall the cold war. It had the potential to do that, but
in the end it failed. With the Soviet Union on the sidelines, the Soviet
satellites gradually quit the game as well. Poland dropped out in
1950; Czechoslovakia was forced out in 1954; Cuba quit after Castro
1121
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
took power, and so on. Romania asserted itself by joining the Fund in
1972, but it wasn't until the 1980s, with the Cold War winding down
and the Soviet system collapsing, that a real movement began.
Hungary joined in 1982, Poland rejoined in 1986, and then Russia
and all of the other countries that emerged from the Soviet ashes
joined in the 1990s.
So we can see both the limitations of the system in failing to
prevent the cold war and the potential of this system in helping bring
Russia and other countries back into the world economy after the
cold war ended. The world has continued, however, to be full of
conflicts, and because of that the IMF-I won't say much about the
World Bank because Uri will be telling you about that in a few
minutes, but this is broadly true of the Bank as well-the IMF has
had to adapt its rules to changing situations.
The function of the IMF is to promote open trading and financial
relationships among countries. But countries, including notably the
United States, will occasionally impose exchange restrictions and
assert that these exchange restrictions are solely for national security
purposes. Once a country asserts that an exchange restriction is for
national security rather than for economic or financial purposes, it
effectively takes it out of the jurisdiction of the IMF because the
Fund is not a suitable forum for discussing or passing judgment on
the validity of military or political disputes. Over the years, this
jurisdictional issue has arisen with regards to restrictions on
Vietnam, Libya, Panama, and Iraq, among others.
So that is another limitation, a case of the glass being half full, if
you will. Conflicts still take place all the time, and whenever a
country is caught up in a conflict, there is very little that the IMF or
the World Bank or any other economic agency can do except wait for
the conflict to end. Otherwise, the institution could just get caught up
in the conflict itself. This happened most recently in Iraq. As soon as
the military "mission was accomplished" in 2003, the U.N. went
back in, the IMF went back in, the World Bank went back in, and
then insurgents blew up the building in Baghdad where they were all
working. Many people were killed, and several IMF staff were
injured, some quite seriously. That forced the Fund to pull its staff
out of Iraq until the situation stabilized.
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But what happens when conflicts end? How can the Bretton
Woods Institutions give hope to countries that help will arrive as
soon as it is realistic to do so? The IMF has a policy of providing
emergency post-conflict assistance, so that as soon as conflicts end-
as in Bosnia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and many other
places-the Fund can go back in very quickly with policy advice,
technical assistance, financial aid and so on. Now this is obviously
not a job that the IMF as an institution can do alone. The key to
making this whole process work is the kind of cooperation that
Ambassador Lacarte discusses, but in an even broader context.
What is important is not just cooperation among the Bretton
Woods Institutions, including the WTO, but also a recognition that
these agencies are part of the broader U.N. system. Under the terms
of a 1948 agreement, the IMF is an independent specialized agency
of the United Nations. The management and staff of the IMF
participate regularly in various agency meetings throughout the U.N.
system. This role has increased over time, and it has become even
more intense recently owing to the crucial role of the IMF in helping
achieve the Millennium Development Goals to cut world poverty in
half.
The IMF, along with the World Bank, is an integral part of that
effort, and it liaises quite regularly with the U.N. to that end. What is
missing from the systemic architecture, if you will, is a more
comprehensive structure for maintaining peace and security in post-
conflict countries so that economic assistance can be made more
effective. While a real solution to that problem may still be a long
way off, in December 2004 the Secretary General of the United
Nations proposed the creation of a new Peace Building Commission
within the United Nations. And he specifically requested that the
heads of the IMF and the World Bank be represented on it, in explicit
recognition of the importance of the links between poverty reduction,
economic growth, and open trading relationships on the one hand,
and the achievement of and maintenance of peace on the other.
To conclude, the topic of this conference is both historical and
very current. If the Bretton Woods Institutions can promote global
prosperity, they will go a long way toward promoting peace and
11232005]
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alleviating conflicts as well. If I may be permitted a moment to plug
my own book a little bit, as you can see from the illustration,4 I gave
it the title Silent Revolution to advance the idea that globalization of
trade and finance is a phenomenon that is taking hold all over the
world and is quietly being accepted in the developing as well as the
developed world. So I will leave you with that thought. Again, my
congratulations to all who have organized this important event.
Thank you all very much.
4. See Diagram, infra p. 1126.
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Mr. Boughton's history of the IMF was published in 2001
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TRADE AS A GUARANTOR OF PEACE,
LIBERTY AND SECURITY? THE ROLE OF
PEACE IN THE BRETTON WOODS
INSTITUTIONS
JULIO A. LACARTE*
Many of the contributors to this conference will deal with the
historical link between trade and peace, yet they will certainly also
underline the way in which war, liberty and trade have come together
so many times in the past, often in a scenario of conflict and
violence.
I find that subject particularly challenging because of its multiple
aspects, but I will resist the temptation to refer to them and
concentrate on the peace role of the Bretton Woods Institutions.
Before we can fully grasp the implications of this peace role, we
need to place it in context. Mankind went through two protracted,
bloody and in every way destructive wars in the twentieth century.
In the aftermath of the 1914-18 World War, efforts were made to
prevent new such armed conflicts. The creation of the League of
Nations answered to this purpose. But the League essentially failed.
It never exerted the necessary political authority to prevent war when
clouds over Europe grew yearly darker; and earlier the onset of the
* Ambassador Lacarte has served as the Trade Minister of Uruguay and as the
Ambassador to EC, India, Japan and Thailand. He also served as the Uruguayan
Ambassador to the United States. He played a major role in the creation of the
GATT, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the WTO.
During the Uruguay Round trade negotiations (1986-1994), Ambassador Lacarte
chaired the institutional negotiations that led to the establishment of the WTO and
its dispute settlement system. Most recently, Ambassador Lacarte has chaired
WTO panels and served as a panelist on a NAFTA Chapter 11 Investment
Arbitration.
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Great Depression found it ill equipped to counter the effects of this
unprecedented collapse of the world economy.
After peace was signed in 1918, a number of restrictions had been
adopted by countries in order to ensure supplies of essential
materials, and this process had led to the creation of vested interests
which proceeded to entrench themselves against all comers. Thus the
new protectionism grew, uncontrolled.
The 1927 League of Nations World Economic Conference was
followed by the Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export
Prohibitions and Restrictions. But to no avail. World War II was in
the offing. Events were on the march. In 1930, the U.S. Congress
approved the highly protectionist Hawley-Smoot Tariff. In 1931, the
world saw a series of damaging competitive devaluations. By May of
1932, the United Kingdom abandoned its free trade policy and began
to apply a general tariff. A few months later, Commonwealth
preferences were set up at the Ottawa Conference. The 1933 London
Monetary and Economic Conference led to nothing. In the meantime,
world trade was collapsing both in volume and value and
protectionism and bilateralism were rampant.
There was a ray of light in this gloom: The United States approved
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934 as a palliative under
which it included a number of bilateral treaties ruled by the most-
favored nation clause which allowed it to register more trade with its
bilateral partners then with those countries with which it did not
make these treaties.
And then, soon after, first Europe and then the world as a whole
plunged into a bitter blood-letting that devastated whole countries,
destroyed productive resources wholesale and brought anguish and
death to countless millions. If there was one thing that people
everywhere wanted at the end of hostilities, it was peace. Peace,
peace above all.
Already before the end of the war, planning had somehow begun
for what was to come. Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had
met on the high seas and proclaimed the Atlantic Charter, which set
out a vision of a peace time community of nations.
The FAO in 1943, the ILO in 1944, and the Bank and Fund
Bretton Woods conference with its recommendation to reduce
obstacles to international trade and promote favorable international
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trade relations were pointers to the future. By 1945, the League of
Nations had issued it pioneering report on "Trade Policy in the Post-
War World."
In June 1945, the U.N. Charter was established with fifty-one
signatures. The aims of the U.N. as set out in the charter were:
-Prevent war and maintain peace and security;
-Reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights for all;
-Respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law; and
-Promote social and economic progress in larger freedom and
for all peoples with full employment.
In the pursuit of these objectives, which placed peace above all, the
United Nations would be assisted by a constellation of specialized
agencies.
And now we come to the role of the Bretton Woods Institutions in
the maintenance of peace. As we all know, the original intention was
that the Bank and Fund would be joined by an International Trade
Organization. In late 1945, the United States presented its draft
charter for an ITO. The proposal went to the Economic and Social
Council, it was debated and a Preparatory Committee for a world
trade conference was appointed.
By October of 1947, this committee had drafted a charter for the
ITO and simultaneously negotiated among its members wide-ranging
tariff concessions under the most-favored nation clause which it
enshrined in a covering text called the General Agreement of Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT").
Between the end of 1947 and early 1948, the fifty-three member
Havana Conference negotiated and agreed to the text of the Havana
Charter for an ITO. Discussions were vigorous and countries
defended their respective positions strongly; yet the success of the
conference was never in doubt because there was a general and
widely shared thrust towards a final agreement that simply had to be
attained. This was the spirit of the times.
It seemed, then, that the Bank-Fund-ITO trilogy was about to
materialize. However, the United States Congress failed to approve
the Havana Charter. Given the enormous relative weight of the
1129
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United States at the time, its rejection was tantamount to condemning
the ITO to oblivion.
This is indeed what happened, but out of the ashes of the ITO rose
the GATT, as a trade instrument (certainly not an international
organization) with the participation of barely more than twenty
countries and with only provisional application.
We could say that the GATT, with its precarious existence, low
membership and tiny budget and Secretariat, was at best the poor
cousin of the Fund and Bank, which were already functioning
actively and well.
For a number of years, the GATT very much lived its own life,
gradually increasing its membership, mainly through successive
tariff negotiating rounds. Institutionally, however, the GATT
remained what it had been at the beginning: a trade agreement being
provisionally applied and thus at risk that at any time, an important
contracting party (such as the United States for example) could
cripple it by withdrawing on short notice.
More than once, the GATT responded to a growth of world-wide
protectionist measures by carrying out new trade liberalization
rounds. This was a significant role that the contracting parties played
in countering practices that might lead to restrictions on international
commerce. In this way, they held the line against developments that
could in some ways parallel the economic events that had preceded
World War II.
The years previous to the Uruguay Round saw another dangerous
surge of protectionism. Initial GATT efforts did not succeed against
this threat and finally contracting parties decided to engage in new
multilateral negotiations which begin in 1986 and became known as
the Uruguay Round.
A long-standing GATT problem then arose very acutely. In
previous rounds, the exchange of concessions had taken place
essentially among industrialized countries, and developing countries
had found little that would have been to their benefit. In these
circumstances, they had simply withdrawn their own offers. As a
consequence, while all contracting parties applied the general
provisions of GATT, there was a marked difference between the
market access facilities enjoyed by the developed and developing
countries.
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It was clear when the Punta del Este Declaration was eventually
approved, that while developing countries as a group would be ready
to participate fully for the first time in a GATT Round, they would
be alert more than ever before to any prospect that the balance of
concessions to be negotiated should turn against them.
The Uruguay Round, in spite of stalemates and deep
disagreements, ended up as the biggest ever trade agreement on
record and all participating countries accepted its commitments and
provisions.
The Uruguay Round meant, at least, two things: developing
countries finally participated fully in a GATT Round by granting
ample trade concessions and the GATT ended it precarious life by
being absorbed into the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), which
was established as an inter-governmental body. In other words, we
had come full circle and after the failure of the ITO more than forty
years earlier, countries had finally set up its modern-day equivalent.
In retrospect, it seems fair to say that the GATT/WTO system has
made significant, indeed an indisputable, contribution to world peace
by holding at bay time and time again those protectionist forces that
constantly threaten the world trading system. International commerce
has increased enormously over more than half a century, and this is
perhaps the best criterion to apply to the GATT/WTO system, which
has also developed over time a dispute settlement mechanism second
to none and which constitutes a permanent guarantee to member
countries that their rights will be respected irrespective of their size
or influence.
Now, the WTO is engaged in the Doha Development Round,
which has been treading water after the Seattle and Cancun fiascos.
However, this in itself is no cause for despair. In the past, similar and
possibly worse episodes have occurred and this is understandable.
WTO commitments are hard law. Once entered into, they are
extremely difficult to ignore. Very large interests are involved in
many WTO decisions and it is unavoidable that everyone should
defend their interests to the hilt. What should surprise us is that it
should ever be otherwise.
The Doha Round has to surmount two big and apparently
intractable obstacles, but it will only succeed if it does so. One is the
balance of benefits and concessions to developing countries which
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have tabled a series of important grievances. The other is agricultural
protectionism, which must not forever continue to be a stumbling
block to commerce and a constant source of recriminations and
tensions between groups of countries.
In sum, the success of the Doha Round will be another bulwark
against protectionism and a renewed stimulus for world trade as a
factor for prosperity, development and peace.
Should it be otherwise, the world trading system, which is
predicated on the rule of the most-favored nation clause, would tend
to emphasize its present important drift towards regionalism and its
fragmented preferential treatments. A failure of the Doha Round
would also mean that no agreed solutions had been found for
agricultural protectionism and this would probably lead to intense
and perhaps intolerable pressures on the WTO dispute settlement
system, as aggrieved countries had recourse to it to put an end to
violations of existing provisions.
All countries, then, whether large or small, have a stake in the
combined success of the WTO, and we must expect them to act
accordingly. There is not much time left for this to happen.
I might close by expressing a wish. When the three legged stool of
Bank, Fund and ITO was conceived, there was the expectation that
these organizations would cooperate closely in pursuit of common
aims. We are constantly being made aware that economic, financial
and trade relations (and their link with development) constitute an
increasing intricate web that sometimes seems to escape our control.
A significantly closer working relationship among the Fund, Bank
and WTO calls for enormous work and preparation as events move
fast and globalization advances apace. The Bank, Fund and WTO
have still to jointly contribute a great deal more to economic
prosperity as a basic pillar supporting world peace.
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I. VISION AT THE CREATION
"Peace and prosperity through trade" was the basic objective on
which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") was
founded almost sixty years ago and it remains the fundamental
raison d'etre of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") today.
Emerging from World War II, governments wanted to build a world
in which nations would use international cooperation and negotiation
to pursue their mutual interests and to resolve problems. They had a
* University of Ottawa Faculty of Law and Former Director, Secretariat of the
WTO Appellate Body (1995-2001).
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great vision: to create an international system that would promote
economic growth and prosperity thereby securing peace. They
believed that by reducing tariffs and trade barriers, standards of
living would be increased, full employment could be achieved, and
real incomes would grow. All of these things, they believed, were
essential to securing and maintaining peace.
You have heard from Ambassador Lacarte, who was present at the
creation of the United Nations, the GATT and the WTO, and from
Mr. Boughton, who has written about the history of the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF"), about the history of the Bretton Woods
Institutions. There are important lessons to be learned from history.
As history has a way of repeating itself, we must always be very
watchful.
II. CROSSROADS TODAY
We are at a crossroads today-a turning point-in history.
Ambassador Allan Gotlieb, a well-known former Canadian
Ambassador to Washington, has expressed his view that:
We are at one of the great historic disjunctures in world
affairs. The most basic concepts, some centuries old, are
being re-examined and rethought. Armed humanitarian
intervention to prevent gross violations of human rights is
superseding classic notions of sovereignty and domestic
jurisdiction; the duty to prevent genocide, nuclear
proliferation, and imminent terrorist acts of mass destruction
raise far-reaching questions about the use of force and
authority, and about legitimacy in the international order.
The restructuring of the world's system of governance raises
issues of pre-eminent importance and high urgency.'
In addition to the very serious problems of poverty, terrorism and
war, we have the monumental challenges and opportunities brought
about by globalization. The international institutions-the United
Nations, the IMF, the World Bank and the GATT-were designed in
the 1940s by a relatively small number of countries to deal with the
1. Allan Gotlieb, When Mr. McKenna Goes to Washington, GLOBE & MAIL,
Feb. 21, 2005, at A I5.
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challenges of the day. As Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin has
emphasized, "The challenge of the next decade is to redesign
international institutions so that they will be capable of addressing
the problems of the future, to make globalization work for the benefit
of all." The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan,
recently released an extensive proposal to reform that organization.
The Director General of the WTO appointed a Consultative Board
chaired by former Director General Peter Sutherland, which has
released a report recommending several institutional changes to the
WTO.
Michel Camdessus, former Managing Director of the IMF,
speaking about the international financial and monetary system, put
the challenge this way:
Increasingly, during this period, the issue of stability of the
international monetary and financial system has been viewed
in the context of the broader issue of world economic
governance. This is not a reference to some kind of world
economic government, but instead to the more limited
ambition of finding a global response to inescapable global
problems. The task is monumental. Ours is the first
generation in history to find itself in the position of being
called upon to influence global affairs, not from a position of
military conquest or imperial power, but through voluntary
international cooperation. The challenge is to find
mechanisms for managing the international economy that do
not compromise the sovereignty of national governments, that
help the smooth and effective working of markets, that
increase opportunities for the poorest, that ensure
international financial stability but that, also, offer solutions
to problems which now transcend the boundaries of the
nation state. A tall order indeed!2
Peter Sutherland, former Director General of the GATT who
guided the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations to a
successful conclusion and Chair of the Consultative Board that
recently issued a report on "The Future of the WTO," has
2. Michel Camdessus, An Agenda for the IMF at the Start of the 21st Century,
Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 1, 2000), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2000/020100.htm.
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emphasized that "multilateralism is a fragile concept-both in
practice and in theory."
Multilateralism and international cooperation, I would suggest,
are essential keys to peace. And like peace, they are delicate
concepts that must be tended carefully by the international
community in order to survive and flourish.
III. CHALLENGES FOR THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM
The multilateral trading system has been very successful in many
respects since the end of the Great Wars of the last century, but it
also faces major challenges. It has been successful in reducing
average tariff rates, particularly on manufactured goods in
industrialized countries. Reform in agriculture and textiles, however,
has been painfully slow. On agricultural subsidies, the major
developed countries have moved backwards. The developing
countries understandably feel that they got a bad deal in the Uruguay
Round, and that the developed countries have not lived up to their
commitments. There is a perception of inequity and imbalance in the
multilateral trading system that must be rectified.
IV. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
The WTO dispute settlement system is often touted as the "jewel
in the crown" of the WTO. Over 320 complaints have been notified
to the WTO since 1995, and, of these, approximately one-fifth have
been resolved diplomatically in consultations between the disputing
parties. Another eighty-five or so cases have been heard by panels,
and over sixty-five appeals have been heard by the Appellate Body.
The fact that governments, particularly the United States and the
European Union, take their disputes to the WTO, rather than
threatening unilateral retaliation, is a significant improvement over
past practice. Compliance with dispute settlement rulings, moreover,
has been relatively good. Despite the common view that compliance
has been a problem, in fact, there have been difficulties in only ten
percent of the cases.
There are, however, storm clouds on the horizon. The United
States and the European Union are finding it increasingly difficult to
comply in certain cases. While smaller and developing countries
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have an excellent compliance record, the same is not true for the two
major players. If the United States and European Union continue to
evade compliance, there is a risk that other countries may follow
their example. As the renowned Professor Robert E. Hudec has
observed, the WTO dispute settlement system will remain effective
only as long as its Members are willing to comply. If that willingness
begins to erode, there could be serious problems ahead for the WTO
dispute settlement system.
Another storm cloud looming is that some very tough cases are
currently being brought in the WTO. Cases involving agricultural
subsidies (the peace clause has expired), food safety, preferences for
developing countries, and trade in services are being brought in
increasing numbers. In the absence of a successful conclusion to the
negotiations in the Doha Round, and without effective rulemaking
mechanisms in the WTO, the dispute settlement system will continue
to be confronted with some very difficult issues in the foreseeable
future. Many of these difficult and complex political issues would be
best resolved by negotiators. There is a limit to how much "gap
filling" and "ambiguity clarifying" the Members of the WTO will
allow the dispute settlement system to do. However, the WTO does
not have effective rulemaking procedures and until reforms are
implemented, an undue amount of pressure may be put on the dispute
settlement system. No doubt, difficult cases will continue to be
brought, but if the dispute settlement rulings are not ultimately
followed, respect for the system will diminish and this will not
enhance the legitimacy of the WTO.
V. GOVERNANCE OF THE WTO
Another major challenge for the WTO lies in the area of
governance. Membership has grown from around 100 states when
the WTO was established ten years ago, to almost 150 today. China
is now an active Member of the WTO and another thirty countries
are in the process of accession, including Russia, several Arab states,
Vietnam and Cambodia. The system has changed. The overwhelming
majority of Members are developing countries. The larger
developing countries-India, Brazil and China-are major players in
the Doha Development Round. At Cancun, they developed the G20,
which has become a new geopolitical force in multilateral trade
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negotiations. Developing countries want to have, and must be given,
a real voice in the multilateral trading system.
Better, more inclusive decision-making and rulemaking processes
need to be developed in the WTO to ensure that all developing
countries, including the least-developed, have an active voice in the
system. The days when the United States and the European Union
could negotiate agreements and impose them on other countries are
long gone.
Developing countries are not a homogeneous group. They do not
have similar powers or interests. The larger ones-India, Brazil and
China-are all doing well economically. They are also negotiating
regional agreements with neighboring countries. In many respects,
these countries do not need the Doha Round, but the multilateral
trading system needs them.
VI. REGIONALISM
Another issue is the growing spectre of regional trade and
investment agreements, the so-called "spaghetti bowl." The
Sutherland Report on "The Future of the WTO" warned that
regionalism is a potential serious threat to the multilateral trading
system. There are over 300 regional trade agreements in the world
today, and there are over 2000 investment agreements. Left
unchecked, this will cause great fragmentation in the multilateral
system.
VII. AMBIGUOUS MANDATE
The WTO appears to have an ambiguous mandate. There are
pressures in the United States and the European Union to expand the
WTO's mandate to include investment, sustainable development,
competition, labor standards and other "non-trade" issues. Observers
have suggested that the WTO should become the "World Economic
Organization" and expand its jurisdiction to include all matters of an
international economic nature. The developing countries are
overwhelmingly opposed to such expansion of the WTO's mandate.
They, however, would like the WTO to take account of their
development needs as well as the particular concerns of smaller
economies.
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There is no common view of the purpose and mandate of the
WTO. It is no longer obvious that trade liberalization is the
fundamental guiding objective of the multilateral system. The old
adage that trade liberalization is like riding a bicycle, you have to
keep going in order to avoid falling off, is no longer applicable.
Sylvia Ostry, a well-known international economist, has
characterized the present system as a bus careening down a hill-no
one knows where it is going, but there are a lot of people hanging on
for their lives.
VIII. CHALLENGES TO LEGITIMACY OF THE
WTO
The WTO also faces the challenge of legitimacy vis-d-vis the
outside world, that is, in its relationship with business, consumers
and civil society. The WTO is not the GATT. It deals with many
areas of domestic regulation that were previously the exclusive
domain of sovereign governments, such as food safety, health and
protection of the environment. To the extent that policies relating to
these important subjects affect trade, government actions can and do
come under WTO scrutiny.
Businesses, consumers and civil society are all stakeholders in the
multilateral trading system. The WTO takes decisions that affect
their interests. Governments must find better ways to consult with
their publics in trade negotiations. The WTO must also do more to
explain its mission in order to allay the pervasive fears many have,
which are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how the
system functions.
IX. CONCLUSION: THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS
Looking through the prism of the past into the future, the
objectives in many ways are the same as they were in the 1940s. That
is, to make the world safe and secure, to alleviate poverty and secure
peace by giving the poor countries of the world the means to achieve
economic growth and prosperity. Trade is, and has proven itself to
be, a major engine for economic growth. However, trade
liberalization will never be the only answer to all of the world's
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problems, including the eradication of poverty, but it is an essential
part of the solution.
The twenty-first century has been marked in its early years by
political instability, economic recession, war and terrorism. These
are difficult times. The world faces many of the same fundamental
choices that confronted it after World War II. Governments must ask
themselves whether they want to proceed along the path of peace and
prosperity through liberalized trade, and continue to foster economic
growth through international cooperation, or retreat into a world
divided by its isolationism, regionalism and protectionism. If the
latter course is taken, the losers will be the smaller and poorer
countries of the world.
The stakes are high; the choice is clear. We can only begin to meet
the daunting challenges of the twenty-first century through enhanced
international cooperation. Let us hope we have learned that much
from the lessons of history.
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Well, I'm very impressed to be on the same panel with
Ambassador Lacarte, Debra Steger and Jim Boughton of the IMF.
I'm very happy to be here. I was very interested in the topic of the
conference and I decided to talk about peace and trade. Not because
I'm especially qualified to talk about politics and peace-maybe I'm
a little more qualified on trade-but really because I'm interested in
the subject and maybe I can share the little bit of light from my
experience in trade work at the Bank.
So, trade and peace-it is clear to me anyway-that there are
circumstances where trade helps consolidate peace. However, John
Stuart Mill's presumption that trade assures peace is clearly not
borne out by the evidence. One is more sympathetic to the view of
the causality running the other way that peace helps promote trade,
* Uri Dadush, a French national, became Director of the International Trade
Department in July 2002. This department provides a single venue for
accountability for trade-related work in the World Bank. In this position, Mr.
Dadush is also responsible for managing the Development Prospects Group. This
Group is responsible for analysis and projections of the world economy and its
implications for developing countries, including the trends in capital flows and
prices of primary commodities. Mr. Dadush was previously Chair of the Economic
Policy Sector Board and Director of Economic Policy. Prior to joining the World
Bank in 1992, Mr. Dadush was President of the Economist Intelligence Unit, part
of The Economist Group, from 1986-1992. He was Group Vice President,
International, for Data Resources, Inc., from 1982-1996. He has also served as a
senior consultant with McKinsey and Co. in Italy and Denmark. Mr. Dadush
received B.A. and M.A. degrees in Economics from Hebrew University and a
Ph.D. in Business Economics from Harvard University.
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or is a prerequisite to successful and durable trade relations, though
here too the evidence is mixed.
Let me talk first about the effects of trade on peace. There are
actually many examples of trade failing to assure peace. We have
heard one today. The two World Wars were preceded by a period of
unprecedented global market integration in the second half of the
nineteenth century. It led people to say in the 1910s and in the 1920s
after the First World War, that this would be the end of war.
A more recent example that I have a little bit of familiarity with,
because I lived in Jerusalem in the end of the 1960s, is the very deep
integration of the Palestinian and Israeli economies in the 1970s and
1980s, following the June War in 1967, which was associated with a
large rise in living standards in the territories. The economic
integration, however, led to great economic dislocation and did not
prevent the two intifadas.
There are also examples where trade itself contributes to tensions
and therefore may cause conflict. Regionalism, which we have heard
about a lot today and which is proliferating, is often justified on the
basis of enhancing peace and security; witness recent European
history. But, the model does not always apply. In this country, for
example, a common market and common external tariff contributed
to the tensions that led to the Civil War, as the agricultural South
wanted cheap industrial imports, which the industrial North was
determined to protect.
Another point. Were trade such a powerful antidote to war, then
you would expect the gains from trade to be widely understood by
the public and perceived by the public to be large. In fact, as I know
firsthand from trying to argue for trade reforms in various contexts,
trade is very rarely an easy sell; it is a very difficult sell. There is, of
course, large theoretical and empirical evidence that trade can be a
source of enormous gains, but these gains are difficult to demonstrate
and defend politically, in part because the largest source of these
gains (what we call the dynamic source of gains, that is, the
increased productivity and innovation which comes from
competition from imports) are intrinsically disruptive. To compound
the problem, as is often said, the losses to the import competing
sectors are highly concentrated and visible, while the more offsetting
gains to the consumer are thinly and widely spread.
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Furthermore, the distributional effects of trade reforms are large.
So most models of trade liberalization would suggest that the
estimates from trade liberalization are in the range of one to two
percent of GDP. But the associated income gains and losses from
redistribution across factors can be two to three times larger. So, if
you assume that the initial factor shares are about equal, the factor
employed intensively in imports loses proportionately two to three
times more than the nation gains on average. The opposite happens
to the factor employed intensively in the export sector. So changes in
the trade regime and trade disputes around an existing trade regime
can be a source of tension, as well as a source of gain.
This relates to new trade liberalization. However, you can say that
once an open trade regime is achieved, it presumably contributes to
changes in the political landscape, which promotes its continuation.
This should be especially evident in the case of deep economic
integration, which entails not just increased trade, but big cross-
border investments, large sum costs in export-dependent factories
and now we have labor specialization along lines of comparative
advantage.
It stands to reason that new and powerful interest groups can then
form, whose welfare depends on the continuation of open markets.
But history shows that the drivers of conflict, when they exist, can be
extremely intense: ethnic divisions, differences in religious beliefs,
ideological rifts and the struggle for resources. In the end, these
forces will overwhelm the gains for trade, even if they are perceived
to be large, which is often not the case.
Now, I would like to make some observations about the effects of
peace on trade. I'd like to make three observations where the effects
are in the other direction. I will start with a brief anecdote from the
World Bank's last-which was also the IMF's last-mission to Iraq,
that Jim Boughton mentioned, just before the explosion of the Canal
Hotel. I happened to be on that mission and I found myself arguing
with the coalition authorities.
Trade liberalization should be nowhere near the top order of
business in Iraq. It is a very unusual situation for me to argue that
trade liberalization is not important. I simply reasoned that few
entrepreneurs were courageous enough to invest in transforming Iraq
into a diversified exporter until their personal security and that of
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their employees was assured, and until an adequate power supply
was restored. This is my little anecdote to underline the importance
of peace for trade.
We often survey how developing countries have fared over the last
fifteen years of extremely rapid global economic integration. We find
that about two-thirds of the people in the developing world reside in
countries where per capita income has been rising at historically
rapid rates-two-and-a-half or three percent or faster. This includes
India and China. But also there are at least a score of other
developing countries besides China and India, many with large
populations, that are growing very fast.
However, excluding the special case of countries in transition,
about five percent of the population in developing countries reside in
countries where per capita income actually declined. When you go
and look at those countries, the most relevant reason that you can
point to for their decline in per capita income is the presence of
either civil or international conflict.
Third point. In a report on globalization that the Bank published in
1997, we asked whether the current global integration was
irreversible. We surveyed the experience of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries to try and address the question. Our conclusion
was, probably not.
Probably not, because economic activity, I'm quoting, "Takes
place in a web of political and social relationships that are not always
well understood or managed." The history of the nineteenth century
of global integration provides some obvious, but still useful, lessons.
The revival of protectionism then took place against the backdrop of
mounting great power rivalry, nationalism, and eventually,
preparation for war.
The bottom line of our review was that if history is a guide, the
continuation of a global integration process is not inevitable. It
depends critically on continued peaceful relations among the great
powers, avoidance of major macro-economic instability, and a
perception-and this is important-that the social inequalities,
incomplete distribution and increased migration that has resulted
from technological change has been adequately addressed.
I would like to make a couple of points on the current situation;
very quickly since many in the panel have mentioned it. I second the
1144 [20:1141
2005] ROLE OF PEACE IN THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS
points made by Ambassador Lacarte and the other speakers about the
importance of moving forward on the Doha process, the importance
of agricultural reforms in particular, and the importance of getting
the developing countries more engaged in the process. I believe that
we are at a serious risk at the moment. The Doha process will either
not conclude, which is less likely, or more likely conclude in what is
frankly from a development perspective, a known event.
I know I've been somewhat pessimistic in my comments. I would
like to end with a note of optimism. There is a huge change
happening in the world, and I'm referring to the rise of China and the
rise of India. I was just in these countries a month ago, talking to the
trade policymakers. I believe that China will be the world's largest
economy in ten or fifteen years. India is quite a ways behind, but
may very well surprise us in the rate of its progress in the course of
the next decade. In my view, there is enormous change happening.
Both of these huge countries are discovering-China has already
discovered it-that the WTO and the world trading system is a
viable, open, rules-based trading system that is actually part of their
vital national interests. There is a scenario-an optimistic scenario-
where these two huge countries will become the biggest defenders of
the system because both of them are discovering enormous export
interests.
Part of the difficulties we are living with at the moment may be
the result of the fact that we are between two periods; a period where
the United States was the biggest promoter of the system to a period
where China and eventually India would be the biggest promoters in
the system. But we are now inbetween, where no clear leadership
exists.
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